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I. ABSTRACT

This article is intended to review the two dominant forms of water
law in the United States. Its mission is to examine the successes and
failures of the two, and argue for a synthesis of these two opposites.
Most states east of the Mississippi River use riparian law: a system that
prioritizes reasonable uses for stream waters and allocates water equitably in times of shortage. In contrast, most states west of the Mississippi River use prior appropriation law - riparian water law's antithesis allocating water in times of shortage using a first in time, first in right
55
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priority system. Prior appropriation arose in Colorado in the late nineteenth century and has enjoyed a quick ascendancy since that time.
Prior appropriation has the benefit of allowing stream water to be used
far from the streambed - or wherever it will be most useful. However,
because prior appropriation water rights can be lost through nonuse,
prior appropriation encourages overuse and waste of stream resources.
This paper proposes that combining the reasonable use aspects of riparian doctrine with the flexibility of prior appropriation would result
in a synthesis that would meet many of today's most pressing water use
problems. In support of this thesis, this paper examines the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's decision in Franco-AmericanCharolaiseLtd. v. Oklahoma
Water Resources Board and its supporting case law. This paper concludes
that the Oklahoma court has proposed a brave and revolutionary new
system for the allocation of stream water.
II. INTRODUCTION
Water is a strange thing. In many ways, water is simply different
from other types of property. It is immensely precious, for life is impossible without its existence. It is a resource that is valuable to some
only when it is consumed and valuable to others only when it is left in
place. It is a fugitive resource not easily reduced to possession; how
can one own a particular stretch of river, if the actual water in the river
keeps changing?
From this viewpoint, it is little surprise that no property scheme
adequately addresses all of the many concerns surrounding water. The
states east of the Mississippi River generally follow riparian law, a communal property regime that tries to preserve the water resource for as
many users as possible. The western states generally follow prior appropriation, a property regime that focuses on private uses of water
and generally seeks to promote consumption. Neither quite seems to
satisfy the peculiar demands of managing water. Riparian doctrine
ignores the value in many consumptive uses; without consumptive use
of water the modern west would likely be a very different place. Meanwhile, prior appropriation has resulted in diminished stream flows that
destroy many valuable instream uses. How does one manage a resource that is valuable to some only when it is consumed and valuable
to others only when it is preserved? Can we devise a property scheme
that reflects water as both private property and public property all at
once?
This paper puts forth the proposition that riparian and prior appropriation doctrines are not irreconcilable, despite their conflicting
histories and viewpoints. Instead, the two water doctrines may form a
Hegelian dialectic, where the collision of two opposing ideas merge
antipodes into a new form; a synthesis that incorporates elements of its
predecessors and represents an innovative step forward in water policy.
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To demonstrate how this merger is possible in theory and why it is
desirable in policy, this article examines several of the conflicts between prior appropriation and riparian water law doctrines. The article attempts to show how each doctrine has succeeded, or failed, and
how they may be combined into a new approach that offers a way to
move forward. Part I discusses property theory: why prior appropriation and riparian doctrines got off to such fundamentally different
starts and their respective goals. Part II considers how each regime
deals with a resource that has many conflicting user groups. Part III
weighs how each regime attempts to supply the flexibility necessary to
manage complex water systems featuring conflicting user groups and
goals. Part IV examines how each system attempts to provide enough
stability to justify investment in water dependent activities. Finally, Part
V investigates the water law in Oklahoma, a state that has attempted to
merge the two doctrines, in order to analyze the results one can expect
from such a merger.
HI.

PROPERTY THEORY: A DESIGN FOR A COMPLICATED
RESOURCE

In order to understand why it is so difficult to develop a coherent

water law system, one must first understand how and why water is such
a different resource. The great English philosopher John Locke described ownership of property as a natural right, one that exists outside
of the social contract between the government and the governed.' According to Locke, one converts a wild resource to personal ownership
through work.' Thus, if one chops down a tree, one has a property
interest in the resulting lumber. Ideally, property changes status by
progressing from common to private ownership.'
Water, especially running water, bucks Locke's model. How can
one own a stream? Many users share the resource, each perhaps. using
her labor to convert a bucketful of water at a time to private ownership.
The river, however, remains for all users. If one user dammed the river
and took its entire flow for the users own benefit, she deprives others
of the fruits of their labor, thereby violating natural law. Water is a
strange thing.
Professor Carol Rose described a linear evolution of water property
rights, based on Locke's theory of the creation of property.4 Professor
1. SeeJOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVER5NMENT 129-33 (1924).
2. Id. at 130-31.
3. Id. at 132.
4. See generally Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law
Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990) (describing a situation where a property
right defined by its public good characteristics may stabilize at the second, communal
property stage). At first this may appear to be more of a "Y" shaped scheme than a
linear scheme. However, since private property is still generally thought to develop
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Rose's theory is analogous to a train ride with three stops and no
switches. Under Rose's model, property is created in three stops.' The
first station is a time of bounty featuring equal access for all to a plentiful resource.' The second stop is a communal property right that protects the dwindling resource for a defined group of users.7 The last
depot is private property where, as the resource continues to shrink
and the user base continues to grow, clearly defined private property
rights replace the communal scheme.! Rose hypothesized that water
property rights could get off at either the second or third station.' Riparian law, centered on a desire to promote communal, instream uses
for water, disembarked at stop two, and remained there largely because
communal rights effectively deal with property characterized as a public good.'" Prior appropriation, largely concerned with facilitating private consumptive uses for water, rode the train to its final stop."
However, this model may not effectively apply to water. Rose suggested stage two was the final resting place for resources with "high
transaction costs and multiple interests,"'" such as river systems, but
perhaps water is a riddle Locke's property theory cannot solve. While a
communal interest in water exists, there is doubtless a private interest
in it as well. Many of the most valuable uses of water are consumptive
applications that benefit one user to the detriment of others. Even
though the private user may obtain a disproportionate benefit, once he
or she consumes the water, both the supply and quality of the remaining water decreases. A property regime that considers only the communal values of water - or only the private values - is incomplete and
inevitably leads to the dissatisfaction of the interests the regime fails to
consider.
If one looks at the development of property rights not as a train
track to private property, but rather as a forking road, one might discover more useful answers. What if the two American regimes are not
evolutionary stages of the same species, but rather two dialectical"s ways
from a communal property phase, the more proper analogy is a linear model where
riparianism and prior appropriation have taken different stops in the same line, rather
than diverged onto different paths.
5. Id. at 263.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 265.
11.
Id.
12. Id. at 285.
13. The words "dialectical," "thesis," "antithesis" and "synthesis" are used in the
Hegelian sense. "The dialectical method involves the notion that movement, or process, or progress, is the result of the conflict of opposites. Traditionally, this dimension
of Hegel's thought has been analyzed in terms of the categories of thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis. Although Hegel tended to avoid these terms, they are helpful in under-
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of dealing with a common resource problem? Nineteenth century
German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel described the
inevitable development of ideas, concepts, and history.'" According to
the dialectical model, an intermediate concept, the thesis, engenders
an opposing concept, the antithesis.' The conflict between the two
opposite ideas eventually leads to the synthesis, a resolution of the conflict that moves the idea closer to a state of truth and perfection.'
The current state of American water law reflects Hegel's model.
The "thesis" riparian law spawned the "antithesis" of prior appropriation, because riparian doctrine did not allow sufficient water consumption in the arid west. What remains now is to develop the "synthesis:"
the combination of the two regimes in order to solve the problems that
each system presents individually.
Far from being a refinement of riparian water law, prior appropriation has many lessons to learn from its supposedly backward eastern
neighbor. Additionally, vice versa, riparian law can learn lessons from
the central philosophy of prior appropriation, which optimizes the
private elements of water. Properly combined, the two regimes potentially may resolve many of their apparently irreconcilable differences.
IV. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN WATER LAW
The United States for all intents and purposes uses two basic systems of water rights, often modified by local rules, or occasionally by
peripheral water rights systems left over from Spanish colonization. 7
The riparian system dominates the eastern half of the country where
non-consumptive water uses, especially the use of hydroelectric power
for mills, have traditionally been more important.'" Originally, riparian
rights were generally assumed suitable for the westward expansion, but
settlers soon proved unwilling to meet the strict instream standards of

standing his concept of the dialectic. The thesis, then, might be an idea or a historical
movement. Such an idea or movement contains within itself incompleteness that gives
rise to opposition, or an antithesis, a conflicting idea or movement. As a result of the
conflict a third point of view arises, a synthesis, which overcomes the conflict by reconciling at a higher level the truth contained in both the thesis and antithesis. This synthesis becomes a new thesis that generates another antithesis, giving rise to a new synthesis, and in such a fashion the process of intellectual or historical development is
continually generated." MIcRosoFr® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2004, Hegel, Georg
Wilhelm
Friedrich,
at
http://encarta.msn.com/encylopedia_761552560/HegelGeorgWilhelm.Friedrich.h
tml (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 39 P. 762, 766 (Cal. 1895);
Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co., 343 P.2d 654, 668 (N.M. 1958).
18. Rose, supra note 4, at 266.
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traditional riparian law.'" Mining and irrigation interests demanded
the ability to move water out of its basin.' Thus, miners and irrigators
created prior appropriation, more or less, as they went along, and water users throughout the West continually operated under its system
since the middle of the nineteenth century."
A. THESIS: THE RIPARIAN WATER LAW DOCTRINE

England and the eastern United States began with a common water
law regime best described as natural flow riparianism.' This water law
system was primarily concerned with protecting stream flow, and
strictly limited water use to owners of land abutting the water body."
The natural flow doctrine protected ancient uses as a fairly well deThe riparian doctrine developed in prefined property right.
industrial England, where frequent rains made consumptive uses for
water less important. Riparian law evolved with the nascent industrial
revolution, where there was very little need to consumptively use water,
but there was great need for the natural flow of streams to power
mills."
In the United States, consumptive use of stream water became
more important. In response, the reasonable use doctrine began to
take form in the courts of the American Northeast." Reasonable use
considers each stream water use correlatively, meaning one may only
judge the reasonableness of a use in the context of other proposed
uses. Where a court determines that a use is reasonable, the court will
allow the use unless the proposed use injures another user." Reason-

19. See Gary D. Allison, Franco-American Charolaise: The Never Ending Story, 30 TULSA
L.J. 1, 3-5 (1994). Many of these settlers were seeking to farm in the "Great American
Desert." The lack of water in the vast majority of land in the plains states made farming impossible in most areas. Still, claiming that the lack of water necessitated the
adoption of prior appropriation seems inapposite. The land belonged to the federal
government, not the settlers, and no one was forcing anyone to set up a farm miles
from any viable source of water. Not until state legislatures specifically adopted prior
appropriation and the federal government approved, did the use changed from one of
will to one of necessity. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at4 n.17.
22. Rose, supra note 4, at 264, 266.
23. Id. at 264.
24. Id. at 268-69.
25.
Id. at 267-68.
26. Id. at 268 n.21.
27.
See generally Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. (4 Mason) 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827);
Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191 (1852); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R.
307, 2 Am.Dec. 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aik. 184, 16 Am.Dec. 696
(Vt. 1827) (illustrating the early judicial interpretation of the reasonable use doctrine).
See, e.g., Elliot, 64 Mass. at 197.
28.

Issue I

SYNTHESIS - A BRAND NEW WATER LA W

able use proved popular throughout the East and the natural flow rule
was all but abandoned.n
The reasonable use system based upon communal correlative rights
sprang up in response to the particular desire to capitalize on the flow
of rivers in order to maximize power generation, an important public
good.' The generation of power, like scenic, recreation, and fishing
uses, was not an especially consumptive use. A consumptive use removes water from the stream, for the most part permanently. Irrigation is the prime example of consumptive use: while some irrigation
water often returns to the stream from the fields, the majority is removed from the system by the crops or through evaporation. Because
the uses most prized during the industrial revolution were nonconsumptive uses that benefited from high stream flows, maximizing
the amount of water in the stream, while allowing some reasonable
uses, maximized the benefits to all of the users." Riparian law's dedication to quasi-public, instream water uses has meant that private, consumptive uses suffered simply because they were not as important in
water rich climates.
As the demand on water use increased, courts and policy makers
had to strengthen the private property interest in water. Professor
Rose suggested the riparian jurisdictions considered prior appropriation in the earliest period of industrialization, but dismissed the regime
in favor of reasonable use riparianism.32 Under Locke's theory of evolution, the move away from prior appropriation would be a step backward from clearly defined private property rights, and an endorsement
of the supposedly unstable communal property interest. Professor
Rose suggested the riparian jurisdictions' decisions to forgo prior appropriation for reasonable use riparianism resulted in order to encourage instream uses of water and, in particular, to reduce transaction
costs for power generation and navigation." The question remains
important today: Is consumption the best use for an increasingly limited water supply or is in situ preservation?

29. But see Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584, 586-87 (Ga. 1980) (relying on the natural
flow rule to decide the case).
30. Rose, supra note 4, at 266.
31. See, e.g., Elliot, 64 Mass. at 195.
32. Rose, supra note 4, at 266.
33. Id. (explaining the emergence of reasonable use riparianism as way to lower
transaction costs). The importance of negotiating or transactions cost for the design
of property has been the subject of voluminous literature. See, e.g., R. H. COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET & THE LAW (1988) (discussing transaction costs generally); R. H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (offering examples of transaction cost reduction).
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B. ANTITHESIS: THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION WATER LAW DOCTRINE
The central goal of the prior appropriation doctrine has always
been to provide for the consumptive use ofwater.' The system evolved
organically, and its different goals and different settings produced
vastly different results. Miners created the basics of the doctrine in the
nineteenth century because they needed a steady water supply to run
their mines. 5 Likewise, pioneers in the West found the most fertile
soils were often in arid areas, far from any sufficient water supply.'
Furthermore, both miners and pioneers often trespassed on federal
public lands, and had no legal claim of ownership on any riparian
property. 7 Finally, because of the investment required to transport the
Miners and
water, the dependability of the right was important.'
farmers required a water law system that would consistently allow the
transport of water over broad distances for consumptive purposes
without regard for instream flow or riparian ownership. 9
Prior appropriation developed to meet these needs. Reflecting the
developers' roots in mining, prior appropriation adopted its central
tenet that the first user "to the stake gets the claim.""0 The doctrine
also enabled a water user to divert water over another's property without permission, echoing the early diversions across public land."
These rules of the rough and tumble mining towns and illicit ditch
diggers spread across the west. The Colorado Supreme Court adopted
prior appropriation in Coffin v. Left HandDitch Co., and since that time
every state west of the Mississippi River has adopted the prior appropriation doctrine to some extent through a court ruling, statute, or
constitutional amendment."
Because the prior appropriation states created their water laws in
response to demands for irrigation, "an aggregate of private goods,"
their laws value consumptive uses over instream uses."3 The focus on
34.

GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 377-78

(4th ed. 2001).
35. Id. at 377.
36. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449-50 (1882).
37. See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western WaterPolicy: Have FederalLaws
and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States'Role , 20 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 3, 6 (2001).
38. Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446.
39. See id. at 447.
40. Bruce Barcott, There's an Old Saying in Colorado: You Can Steal My Wife, but Not My
gater, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 48, 49.
41. Id.
Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447; COGGINS ET AL., supranote 34, at 377.
42.
43. Rose, supra note 4, at 293. The expression "an aggregate of private goods"
means that each water user benefits privately from the water use to the public detriment. Each appropriator consumes some of the stream water, usually returning water
to the river that is contaminated with fertilizers, salt and other pollutants. In consequence, the remaining resource is diminished, and other users of the resource suffer
for a private benefit.
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private goods has marginalized water's public good aspects and neglected instream uses such as fishing, scenery, recreation, and environmental services. In response, western jurisdictions have begun to
recognize the importance of instream values and started, to some extent, to communalize their water rights."
C. SYNTHESIS: RIPARIAN AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINES MAKE
CAUTIOUS STEPS TOWARD A MIDDLE GROUND
Over the course of the nineteenth century, riparian and prior appropriation doctrines solidified in their respective jurisdictions. As
time passed, legal scholars began to consider the two systems polar
opposites,4' and despite the readily apparent weaknesses on both sides,
commentators, judges, and legislators paid little thought to the lessons
each regime could learn from the other's successes and failures. Instead, most commentators ignored the riparian doctrine except as a
curiosity of property development.' Prior appropriation has been seen
as a private property regime whose failings can perhaps best be cured
through market transactions. 7 However, dogma does not bind men
and women, instead they should feel free to discard failed laws and
policies and adopt those that have worked for others. 4
Nor is the combination of the regimes merely a theoretical exercise, as a closer look reveals most states may have already eroded some

44. Id. at 293-94. But see generally Reed D. Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in the Pacfic Northwest, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation,
28 ENVrL. L. 881 (1998) (detailing how four Northwestern states often do not follow
the traditional prior appropriation doctrine).
45.
See Rose, supra note 4, at 293 (contrasting the value placed on water by each
system); Todd S. Hageman, Water Law: Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma
Water Resources Board: The Oklahoma Supreme Court's Resurrection of Riparian Rights
Leaves Municipal Water Supplies High and Dry, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 183, 185 (1994) (discussing the irreconcilable difference between the two systems).
46. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 4, at 264 (citing a study addressing riparian rights in
the context of property development).
47. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The
Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 317 (2000) (explaining
why water should be treated as a public good); but see Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and
the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27 (1996) (arguing that water markets are inefficient
and do not help solve water shortage problems).
48. The doctrine of stare decisis conflicts with this statement. When the need to
adopt a new system of policy is apparent courts typically demonstrated a willingness to
adopt those systems regardless of the arguments of precedent. See, e.g., Elliot v.
Fitchburg R.R., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 193 (1852) (abandoning Massachusetts's
occupancy rules with no discussion of why or under what precedent they were doing
so). While hesitating to make the comparison, the United States Supreme Court was
not deterred by precedent when passing the great Civil Rights decisions. Finally, judicial decisions are not the only methods for altering policy, or even the primary
method. The political branches of government possess the primary duty to change
policy and they are not constrained by stare decisis.
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characteristics of prior appropriation and riparian doctrines. Arguments over allocation have resulted in widespread reexamination of
prior appropriation law in the west." Concurrently, water shortages in
the East resulted in calls for more availability of water for municipal,
agricultural, and fishing uses."
Both riparianism and prior appropriation have failed to some extent as a method for allocating water resources. Prior appropriation
has led to waste and poor choices about who receives water for what
In response, many western prior appropriation states
purpose."
adopted permitting schemes and instream water rights in an attempt to
better incorporate the broader public interest in their water law and
reflect good water policy. 2 Meanwhile, riparian law has long been on a
path away from its common law roots in the natural flow doctrine and
has evolved to allow consumptive use of water," the transference of
water rights, and even transbasin water use in some cases."
In the past century prior appropriation and riparian doctrines have
thus been quietly moving towards a common middle. The riparian
doctrine experienced statutory alterations designed to make eastern
rivers more productive.95 The great weakness of riparian law is that it
marginalizes consumptive uses of water and makes the transfer of water
rights off of riparian land very difficult. However, eastern states have
increasingly amended riparian law to improve transferability and to
relax the traditional restriction on water use away from riparian land to
allow market forces to put water to the most economically beneficial
use. Additionally, many jurisdictions now require states to permit riparian rights. Most states presently control water use, encourage consumptive use to some extent, and buttress the reliability of water rights.
The appropriative right has moved in the other direction: away
from an all-costs consumptive use approach and towards a position that
gives more protection to non-consumptive uses. In an effort to keep
some water in the stream for in situ uses, such as fishing and recreation, many western states now recognize instream uses as beneficial.
Most western states also have permit restrictions on appropriation that
put at least some regulatory control in the hands of the government.
49. Rose, supra note 4, at 293-94. See generally Benson, supra note 44 (arguing the
apparent movement toward communal interests in water have been frustrated by an
unwillingness to apply even the basic elements of prior appropriation law).
50. See, e.g., DouglasJehl, Atlanta's Growing Thirst Creates Water War, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2002, at A8. See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. 82, § 105.12(B) (West 1990).
51. Freyfogle, supra note 47, at 27-28.
52. See Benson, supra note 44, at 893-96 (listing examples of permitting systems and
methods employed by states to prevent water waste, while promoting beneficial use).
53. SeeElliot, 64 Mass. at 193-94.
54. See, e.g., Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Okla. 1946).
55. Rose, supranote 4, at 293.
56.

Id. at 293-94.
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While riparian law and prior appropriation law are to some extent
merging already, many commentators and scholars still look at the two
regimes as matter and antimatter, oil and water; impossible to combine
in a stable form. " However, law is not necessarily binary; there is no
immutable rule of law that demands riparian and appropriative regimes must remain forever separate or forever enemies. In order to
properly consider the complicated and special aspects of water, one
must create a complicated and special property scheme to manage the
resource. Since water has both private and public goods associated
with it, the property scheme must be both private and communal. The
scheme must allow consumption of the resource, but only if allowing
consumption is the most efficient choice compared to the full range of
alternative uses.
V. FRICTION: STEPS TOWARD AND REASONS FOR MERGER
When one makes policy decisions, the scope of one's inspection is
vitally important to the quality of the decision. When one makes economic decisions with too narrow a purpose, without considering the
full range of opportunities and outcomes, the results are often disastrous. Thus, we have poisoned cotton fields in Uzbekistan, boondoggled water projects in Arizona, and sprawling development in Los Angeles.' To the extent that both riparian and prior appropriation jurisdictions are attempting to consider the full range of uses for water,
they should be on a path toward more efficient results and better water
policy. However, if those jurisdictions do not examine the entire range
of uses, externalities will result and inefficiencies will damage the resource.
An externality is an economic concept that describes inefficiencies
generated by transactions that produce costs for third parties. Ideally,
in a transaction each party exchanges goods or services of equal value.
An externality arises when neither party addresses a cost of the transaction that should rightly be borne by one of the parties to the transaction. An example is when a driver purchases of a tank of gas. The
driver pays the gas station for the fuel and the gas station exchanges
the fuel for money, but in this simple example neither party pays for
the cost of the air pollution the fuel generates when it burns. The increasing air pollution is an external cost of the transaction. If unaddressed, externalities can cause mounting problems. Since neither
57.

See id. at 265 (contrasting the different purposes of each system).

58. See generally David H. Getches, From Ashkabad, to Wellton-Mohawk, to Los Angeles:
The Drought in WaterPolicy, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 523 (1993). Getches uses the examples
of Ashkabad, Wellton-Mohawk, and Los Angeles to demonstrate that unintended consequences often result from well-meaning, but poorly considered projects that do not
consider either the full range of opportunity costs or external costs. Such costs occasionally make the original decision seem breathtakingly foolish in retrospect.
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party pays a direct cost for the air pollution, neither party has a direct
incentive to address the problem. Each faces the potential health and
environmental costs of air pollution, but because those costs are so
minor in each transaction and every such transaction entails the same
external costs, both parties ignore the externality. Over time and as a
result of a great many gallons of gas sold, air pollution has very real
costs for everyone from asthma, to acid rain, to global warming.
Externalities are best addressed by regulation, and closing externalities is a core purpose for government. Gasoline taxes push the cost of
a gallon of gas closer to its efficient level, and when the proceeds of
such taxes are used to ameliorate the effects of air pollution, the government takes a step toward closing the externality.
External costs may be readily apparent, or they may be latent and
difficult to discern. One needs a very broad focus in order to notice
and then close externalities, as even small costs left unaddressed in a
market transaction can accumulate and cause major problems over
time. In the water context, reduced or eliminated stream flows entail a
variety of obvious and subtle external costs. If there is no water in the
river, an obvious cost is the loss of potentially valuable recreational opportunities. If a group of users takes the whole stream to water their
crops, then other users are unable to use the same water to irrigate
their crops, power their mills, or cool their power plants. However, an
emptied stream has other costs as well: property values sink, fish and
wildlife suffer, ecosystem services are lost, aesthetic beauty is sacrificed,
and tourism declines. To ensure the most efficient use of water, one
must consider all the costs, including the costs of the opportunities lost
because of the diminution of the resource.
Riparian and prior appropriation water law doctrines address this
issue in different ways. Each started at opposite ends of the spectrum,
but they have moved closer together over time. To some extent, the
process of synthesis has been long underway.
A.

THE SEARCH FOR A SUFFICIENTLY BROAD SCOPE OF INSPECTION

Early in riparian law's development, the doctrine addressed problems through a very narrow lens. Only "natural" uses were allowed and
all "artificial" uses were unacceptable per se. 9 The distinction between
natural and artificial uses was particularly inconvenient because irrigation was not included as a natural use. The vast majority of states rejected the natural use doctrine, and those states replaced the natural
59.
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Natural uses are those identified as "domestic uses," which include drinking, bathing,
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use doctrine with the reasonable use doctrine." Under reasonable use,
water may be used reasonably, even if some of the stream water is
thereby consumed.'
Courts determine reasonableness case by case, even if a use was
reasonable in the past, a court may deem it unreasonable in the future
if conditions change." The Restatement Second of Torts lists several
reasonableness factors the courts should consider: a) the purpose of
the use; b) the suitability of use to the watershed or lake; c) the economic value of the use; d) the social value of the use; e) the extent and
amount of harm it causes; f) the practicality of avoiding such harm by
adjusting the use or method of use of one proprietor or the other; g)
the practicality of adjusting quantity of water used by each proprietor;
h) the protection of existing values of water uses, land, investments,
and enterprises; and 63i) the justice of requiring the user causing the
harm to bear the cost.
A court will allow a use that is reasonable to continue, while it will
not protect an unreasonable use if challenged.' If all uses are reasonable, a court will apportion the water among the users so that the
stream accommodates as many reasonable uses as possible." In times
of shortage the definition of reasonable changes and some uses will
inevitably be curtailed. Thus, the water uses of other riparian owners
limits the extent of another's riparian right. Many commentators see
this flexibility as the central drawback of riparian law, because of the
resulting reduction in the certainty of the water right and to some extent the flexibility may reduce incentives for investment.' However,
the correlative nature of riparian rights means the system has great
flexibility and assures that in times of drought water will be apportioned equitably, not based on a predictable but arbitrary hierarchy
that may utterly deny water to the those who would use it most beneficially simply because their uses were established relatively recently.
Appropriation doctrine allows users to divert water for beneficial
use only.67 Beneficial use is a more static concept in practice than reasonable use, and, as a result, a water user may generally expect a use
that a court deemed beneficial in the past to remain protected in the
future.' Beneficial use is closely tied to diversion. Historically, in60.
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stream uses were not beneficial uses, perhaps because leaving the water
instream was not considered use."° Beneficial use generally requires
actual diversion and then implementation in some type of economic,
environmental, recreational, or aesthetic activity.7"
Beneficial use and reasonable use are most importantly distinguished by the breadth of their scope. Reasonable use considers the
entire array of factors in determining which use will prevail during a
conflict. Because one must consider so many factors in making the
reasonable use judgment, the outcome of a conflict is hard to predict.
However, what the doctrine lacks in certainty, it makes up for in fairness and flexibility. Ideally, prior appropriation has a very clear winner
and loser. As long as both uses are beneficial, the holder of the senior
water right will prevail. The scope of the decision is narrowly focused;
the only factor that really matters is priority. While the outcome is
predictable, and thus encourages investment, the outcome may not be
equitable or consider the external effects of the decision and thus be
inefficient.
Imagine that two users are in conflict over the flow of a stream.
One user runs a white water rafting company and the other is an irrigator with a senior water right. Both uses are beneficial, but the raft company does not divert, and, therefore, cannot hold a water right in most
states. In a prior appropriation jurisdiction, the irrigator will win every
time. If the irrigator grows high value crops and the rafting company
is small, then giving the water to the irrigator would perhaps be an efficient outcome. However, if the rafting company is more profitable,
or if there are significant external costs to the irrigation, then the likely
outcome may be quite inefficient. Making decisions based on data that
are unrelated to the costs and benefits of the transaction - and the duration of water use has little bearing on the use's benefits - is a poor
way to reach reasonable conclusions.
In a riparian jurisdiction the outcomes of such clashes are uncertain, but the results will be more equitable and more fairly reasoned.
The court will consider the amount of flow both users will need, the
relative economic value of each use, and, most importantly, the effect
of the use on other riparian owners. Because the reasonable use analysis views the situation so broadly, the court is empowered to make decisions that maximize efficiency and minimize adverse external effects.
Imagine that the above irrigator dries up the entire river. While the
irrigator's use may be more economically valuable than the rafting
company's, after considering the results of the use, significant costs
exist. No third-party users may use the water, which eliminates potentially valuable enterprises. Property values may be lowered because of
the lost water frontage. Ecological services may be lost. Fishermen
69. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882).
70. Allison, supra note l9, at 6.
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may not be able to fish and perhaps the neighborhood fly store will go
out of business. On the whole, allowing the water to go to the irrigator
might be a disastrous decision. Or it might not be. The point is that
under reasonable use review, a court may examine the totality of the
circumstances. Under prior appropriation, a court may not.
On the other hand, prior appropriation is theoretically well suited
for market transactions because of the certainty of the rights in question. Ideally, one knows exactly what one is purchasing when one buys
a water right and a purchaser will spend more for a senior right than a
junior right. In a properly functioning market, market action will ensure that water goes to its highest use. However, the exchange of water
rights is not, and probably cannot be, governed by market transactions,
because many factors conspire to cause failures that cannot be remedied without intervention. There are too few sellers, too few buyers,
and there are many external costs to the transaction. The transferability of both riparian rights and prior appropriation rights are reviewed
in the next section.
B.

THE DOCTRINES INCREASINGLY SEEK TO ALLOW FOR FLEXIBILITY

Occasionally, water users must change various aspects of their use.
The user may wish to stop farming and open a factory; she may wish to
use water in the winter instead of the summer; she may desire to take
more water, take water from a different location, or she may wish to
convey her water right to another party. Each regime places limitations on the permissibility of such alterations.
Riparian rules make it easy to change types of use, amount of use,
and time of use, but the rules have also placed limitations on transfer
of the right to non-riparian parties. The reasonable use doctrine is
flexible and it places the burden on the plaintiff to show injury resulting from his neighbor's changing use." On the contrary, the riparian
water right often may not be transferred to parties who do not own
riparian property and the water may not be used off of the riparian
tract.
1. Regulated Riparianism and the Model Water Code
The difficulty involved in transferring water rights has traditionally
been seen as a telling weakness of riparian law. Selling riparian rights
is difficult because of how reasonableness changes. The extent of the
right is hard to quantify, resulting in difficulty in setting a price for the
riparian right. In response, many states have moved toward a regulated riparian doctrine. Such efforts exist in a continuum from patchy
water statutes slightly altering the common law riparian background
71.
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through.permit requirements to the Regulated Riparian Model Water
Code ("Model Code").' Nineteen states require permits or other restrictions similar to those proposed in the Model Code", though none
have yet fully adopted the Model Code. Regulated riparian law retains
traditional reasonable use's dependence on equitable balancing, but
permits changing many rights that common law riparian owners take
for granted. Time of use, amount of use, and duration of use are all
likely to be restricted. Renewing permits means the government has
some control over the change of uses.
The Model Code makes several progressive policy decisions. First,
and perhaps most importantly, the code ambitiously attempts to untie
the riparian right from the riparian land."4 The Model Code allows
non-riparian property owners to purchase riparian water rights separate from the land so they may use water on non-riparian land. The
Model Code adopts the unity of title rule, meaning a riparian may
freely use water on all contiguous portions of his property." Finally,
the Model Code rejects the watershed limitation, supplementing its
definition of reasonable use as the only check on out of basin transfers
with a requirement that parties seeking an inter-basin transfer pay a fee
into a compensation fund." In determining reasonableness, the Model
Code suggests priorities favoring consumptive use of water, placing
human consumption first, followed by agricultural demands, and finally all other uses in order of their sustainable economic benefits.78
This order of preference closely parallels the classification of beneficial
uses in prior appropriation jurisdictions, again indicating progress
away from pure riparianism and toward appropriation doctrine.
Adopting a code to regulate the common law riparian doctrine instills some predictability. At least in theory, a code reflects the broad
vision and expertise of water experts. Such expertise should allow for
the unified plan necessary in dealing with a common resource that ad
hoc court decisions cannot supply. The code changes the role of the
court by placing the court in a position of deference to agency expertise. 9 The courts maintain authority to oversee the agency action, en72.
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suring that the agency does not act arbitrarily or unconstitutionally.
From a certain point of view, however, adopting the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code politicizes the process. Certain groups are
more likely to influence legislative decision-making than others. To
the extent that the legislature considers more narrowed positions, the
unaddressed externalities will continue to diminish the value of the
policy behind its actions.
2. Prior Appropriation Doctrine and Market Realities
The Model Code moves further away from the natural flow doctrine, adopting some of the core aspects of appropriation doctrine,
such as easy transferability and relaxed place of use restrictions. At the
same time, prior appropriation states, faced with dewatered streams
and rampant waste, have moved toward certain riparian ideals. Many
states have asserted instream uses may be beneficial uses. Diversion is
sometimes no longer necessary to initiate a water right. While there is
no explicit adoption of anything like a natural flow doctrine, both represent attempts to keep water instream.
Reasonable use has been embraced to some extent as well. Some
western states attempted to enforce the doctrine of waste as they have
come to the conclusion that wasteful uses are simply not reasonable.
California has acknowledged a public trust obligation to its citizens
that requires the state to keep some water instream.' Permitting requirements in most states theoretically give the state authority to reexamine the reasonableness of uses when the permits come up for renewal. While most of these efforts have had little practical effect on
how water is used and how streams are managed, they probably reflect
an acknowledgment that prior appropriation has produced many
negative externalities that need attention.
In theory, one of the greatest strengths of prior appropriation doctrine is its amenability to transfer. The argument goes that the ability
to transfer water rights will allow market forces to dictate how the water
is used. The water will then be put to its highest best economic use
and waste will be minimized.
Unfortunately, various obstacles have led to quite the opposite outcome. While ancient use featured strict rules, at least in part to encourage market transactions, prior appropriation's strict rules tend to
discourage market transactions. When an appropriator wishes to
change her water right in any material aspect, she must show that her
alteration does not harm other appropriators, even if they are junior to
the appropriator seeking the change.81 When one uses river water for
80. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169-70 (Ct.
App. 1986).
81. Benson, supra note 44, at 887.
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irrigation, a certain amount of the water is lost to the atmosphere or
absorbed by the crops, but a certain amount also predictably returns to
the river; this water is called return flow. Junior users may legally depend on senior users' return flows for their own water supply, so a
court may bar any change in use that negatively affects the rights of
junior appropriators. The burden of proof lies with the party seeking
to change an aspect of her use 3 and since there is essentially no metering of water on any stream in many states, it is often very difficult to
prove the proposed changed will not affectjunior users.
Further, since users may over-appropriate many waterways and utilize the maximum flow of the river, nearly any change in use is likely to
have some effect on the amount of water available to downstream users. Prior appropriation law does not bar transferring a water right to
other parties or other places, even to sites outside of the basin of origin.84 However, such transfers face the same procedural difficulties as
changing the type or place of use, thus, the return flow doctrine creates a gridlock of obstacles and perverse incentives for appropriators
who wish to change aspects of their water right.
Without the role of market signals in resource management, users
will rarely put the resource to its highest and best use." The true and
best use is obfuscated and no party fully considers the externalities and
opportunity costs. In part, this is why many senior water rights use
their water for economically inefficient purposes, such as irrigating
low-value, water intensive crops such as hay and alfalfa. 6 Inefficient
uses consume the resource more quickly with less benefit to society as a
whole. If market transactions were allowed to occur, perhaps instream
users would be willing to pay more to keep water in the river than
farmers are willing to pay to remove the water from the river. Because
transferability is discouraged, the market does not exercise as much
control over how water is allocated as some commentators believe is
necessary."
Unfortunately, even if transfers did not protect junior appropriators, there is no consensus that market operation would lead to efficient results.' Water markets suffer because there is a small pool of
82.
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market participants, are high transaction costs, and a lack of perfect
knowledge about the costs and outcomes of actions in the complicated
hydrological system." Additionally, water's public character creates
many externalities to which market forces are largely unable to respond. When large benefits are spread out among many people, their
value may be overlooked because of the dispersal. Thus, ecological
services and wildlife values, which the vast majority of people probably
value as background interests, are often ignored. Unless society as a
whole can aggregate its anxieties and focus them either politically or
economically, the relatively unprofitable users will continue to dominate water policy. These diffuse concerns are further diluted because
they may only manifest over a period of time and thus are valued at a
discount.
Market action does not protect the public values of many resources
adequately. To protect these values the government regulates many
areas of the market. The relative importance of the public goods of
waterways demands the government regulate carefully. The need to
regulate water for the public good is not new, but it is too often forgotten.
C. CERTAINTY OF RIGHT AND CERTAINTY OF SUPPLY

Transaction costs are a central reason markets have failed to properly distribute water rights in prior appropriation states. They are not,
however, the only obstacle. The common wisdom holds that prior appropriation is necessary to economic development because it creates
certain water rights that investors may rely upon. While it is true that
prior appropriation promises to provide a certainty of right in senior
users, it often results in an uncertainty of supply for numerous reasons.
It is important to carefully consider the tension between certainty of
right and certainty of supply, as both are important.
First it time, first in right is the central tenet of prior appropriation
law. The benefit of this system is the clear certainty that senior users
have to their water right. In contrast, the rights of riparian users are
murky and ever changing,' leading at least one commentator to label
riparian rights "archaic and awkward."" This viewpoint overlooks that
certainty of right is worth little if there is no certainty of supply.
The riparian system places great stock in supplying water to all riparian owners on a river. The right is uncertain, but it does make water available for reasonable use. On the other hand, there is a great
deal of uncertainty in the prior appropriation system as a result of
89.
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three factors: (1) widespread lack of political will for enforcement of
the doctrine's tenets; (2) a lack of information on how much water is
available and how much is used; and, (3) the absence of a clear and
effective definition of waste."
The supposed certainty of prior appropriation is further eroded
because sub rosa rules designed to protect existing uses have replaced
the basic rules of prior appropriation." There can be no certainty
when the legal rules are not enforced: changing administrations can
decide to enforce the prior appropriation doctrine diligently, or they
may follow the sub rosa code. The results could be extremely different
"No one, not even the owner of
through no fault of the diverters
vested senior water rights, should assume that her interests are safe
simply because she is entitled to protection under basic water law
rules."96 Without certainty of supply, the certainty of right should mean
little to investors. This lack of certainty is another factor that frustrates
the operation of market forces on water allocation in prior appropriation states.
Secondly, while the amount of water a user may claim and the order of the users is certain, most users simply have no idea how much
water they divert. There is consequently a great deal of uncertainty in
enforcement. Without accurate measurements of water flow and studies of the situational hydrology, it is difficult to know when a junior
user injures a senior user. Where there is a lack of good information
about water availability or water use, "existing uses may differ dramatically from users' legal rights."" Moreover, states tend to apply the
9
When legal
prior appropriation rules unevenly and inconsistently."
rights conflict with actual use, there is no certainty, there is no right,
and there is no law.
Finally, while the standard in every western state is beneficial use
without waste, the definition of waste has proved elusive and ineffective
at improving efficiency in practice. " A commonsense definition of
waste would include water that could be retained if best practices were
used or water that is more costly to lose than retain. However, courts
have decided waste is "the amount of flow diverted in excess of reason93. Benson, supra note 44, at 893.
94. Id. at 890 ("With rare exception, states abide by the following basic precepts: 1)
enforce the law only when necessary, 2) change the law where needed to protect existing uses, 3) avoid the position of having to curtail established water uses, 4) prevent
instream demands from threatening existing out-of-stream uses.").
95. Id.at901.
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97. Id. at 889.
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2001),
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able needs under customary practices.""° Basing a definition of waste
on existing practices runs afoul of the same problems of granting priority to the oldest uses; old uses are often inefficient and wasteful.
The customary practices definition of waste provides no incentive
for conservation; users with favorable priority rights continue their
wasteful practices because those practices are customary. If thirty,
forty, fifty, even sixty percent of their diversion is lost through leakage
on the way to their fields; there is no cost to them. Junior users and
the health of the river may suffer, but the senior user is unlikely to face
a diminished water right because a court finds his use wasteful.'"' More
perversely still, water saved by adopting more efficient methods of use
and diversion is not added to the user's water right. Thus, a senior
water user faces no real threat of punishment for inefficient practices
and no real benefit from adopting better practices."2 Again, a certainty
of right is only helpful for the most senior rights holders. The other
users should be more worried about certainty of supply.
As we have seen, numerous factors frustrate the promise of efficient water allocation under a prior appropriation regime. Also, riparian rights in their historic form are probably too strict to support reasonable development. I propose a complete merger of the two regimes
as a solution to their separate problems. In 1993, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma attempted just such a merger, essentially placing prior
appropriation on top of a bedrock of riparian rights. The following
section analyzes the Oklahoma Doctrine.
VI. THE OKLAHOMA DOCTRINE: AN EXAMPLE OF MERGER
To summarize the previous discussion, we have seen the complicated characteristics of water call for a complicated system of rights to
govern its use. Prior appropriation and riparian water law are two opposed responses to the same problem: how do you regulate a resource
that is defined both by its communal nature and its private nature?
Riparian law values the communal at the expense of the private, while
prior appropriation allows the communal resource to suffer for the
benefit of private users.
Each approach is single minded and each has failed in significant
ways. Riparian law leaves a property owner with a fuzzy right that is
difficult to quantify; it allows for little consumptive use and generally
no off property or transbasin use. These restrictions hamper investment and market operation. On the other hand, prior appropriation
has resulted in vast consumptive use and the degradation of the resource. Further, because the system is so dedicated to private rights,
100.
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the public good aspects of water are ignored, and the myopic "beneficial" use review does not leave room to consider the "best" use. Finally,
states have not applied prior appropriation law consistently, so while
certainty exists in the paper right, there is little certainty that each user
actually receives her fair share.
Meanwhile, Oklahoma acknowledged concurrent riparian and appropriative rights, threatening to merge the two doctrines into a new
synthesis. Oklahoma added itself to the list of states that honor both
riparian and appropriative rights in 1990 when it handed down its controversial decision in Franco-American Charolaise v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board.' Franco-American is heralded for "resurrecting the fullblooded common law riparian right from the dead.""'4 Commentators
have remarked that the case provided unwarranted, paternalistic protection for riparian water users ' in a manner that created a "[c]haotic
[w]ater [r]ights [r]egime"'' ° and damaged the prestige of the court."'
Commentaries approvingly analogized the Oklahoma holding 1. to
California's protective take on the public trust doctrine in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court ofAlpine County."'°
So which is Franco-American? Is it the end for economic growth in
Oklahoma? Is it a policy tool on par with the landmark Mono Lake
decision? Is it a black eye for the court? Is it defensible on either a
legal or a policy basis?
A. OKLAHOMA WATER LAW'S EARLY DEVELOPMENT

In actuality, Franco-American was the final step in a string of cases
that attempted to fuse the two doctrines. Oklahoma had acknowledged both riparian and prior appropriation rights since 1897 when
the legislature allowed appropriation with the consent of riparian owners, though water could be taken for public use by condemnation
without riparian consent." '° Oklahoma removed the riparian permission clause in 1905, added it back in 1909, and eliminated it again in
1910."' In 1925, the legislature passed a further law that stated beneficial use would form the basis of all water uses and all appropriation for
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irrigation could only be used on appurtenant lands.'2 Even after 1925,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided several cases that made it clear
the riparian right was a live issue in the state. These cases also significandy changed the right, maximizing the ability to use water consumptively within a reasonable use system.
The 1933 case of Broady v. Furray involved a dispute over a natural
dam that formed as a result of a flood.'2 Plaintiff operated a fish
hatchery and recreational fishing resort in the resulting pond."' Defendant sought to remove the dam, but was barred."' The court held
each user was entitled to a reasonable use of the stream.' The court
ruled that reasonableness depends on whether removal of the dam
resulted in a greater loss to plaintiff than its removal would benefit the
defendant."7 Because the dam caused little, if any, damage to the defendant and provided a valuable service for the plaintiff, the court
concluded its use was reasonable and barred its removal."'
In 1946 the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Smith v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas."9 The court upheld Broady and significantly altered the traditional common law." The court held that conveying a riparian right
to a third party and using riparian water off of riparian property were
not per si unreasonable activities."2 ' The court took a broad view of how
a riparian land owner may act reasonably: "[A] riparian owner has the
right to make any use of water, beneficial to himself, which his situation makes possible, so long as he does not inflict substantial or material injury on those below him who are to be deemed as having corresponding rights. '"" Further, the court held riparian law was "not a doctrine of fixed rights""'2 and it took pains not to limit the scope of uses
the parties could pursue in the future. In perhaps the most telling
harbinger of Franco-American, the Smith court refused to uphold the
statutory requirement that entitled riparian owners to the natural flow
of the stream, stating "[t] he contention ...can be supported only by a
literal definition of the statute." l. The court showed a willingness to
disregard even very clear commands by the state legislature.
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In 1956, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Baker v. Ellis,'
which clarified the relationship between consumptive use by riparian
owners and the right to continued flow. Baker held "the right of all to
have the stream substantially preserved in its natural size, flow and purity, and protected against material diversion."' " While the court
strenuously pointed out that it must judge each reasonableness ruling
on its particular facts, it held that a riparian may not block the flow of a
stream so that little or no water reaches his downstream neighbors.
B.

FRANCO-AMERICAN CHAROLAISE V. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BoARD

In 1963 the legislature passed a statute intended to reconcile the
two water law regimes."n The 1963 statute limited all future riparian
rights to domestic uses."n

The act allowed users to convert current

beneficial riparian uses to appropriative rights, but the riparian right
suffered from many restrictions and limitations that effectively ren-

dered it a poor relation to its appropriative cousin." All future water
rights, except riparian domestic uses, would be acquired by appropriation. The act effectively capped riparian use to preexisting "beneficial"
uses, but even these preexisting uses had to be converted to appropriative rights in order to be maintained."u This required riparian owners

wishing to acquire an appropriative right to participate in "vested
rights proceedings" that few riparian owners knew about' or had sufficient financial stakes in to warrant their participation.'
Even this low
level of protection for riparian owners was limited to those who somehow received notice of the requirement to attend a vested rights pro-

125. Baker v.Ellis, 292 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1956).
126. Id. at 1038 (emphasis added). While it appears reasonable to conclude that
"all" refers to all riparian owners, the holding of Franco-American seems to indicate that
the. Supreme Court, unlike the state legislature, may in fact be read literally. If "all"
means a literal all, then this may be another support in the link that Kershen perceives
between Oklahoma's riparian jurisprudence and California's public trust doctrine. See
Kershen, supra note 108, at 392-93.
127. OKLA.STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1963).
128. Id.
129. See Allison, supra note 19, at 19-20 n.91 (discussing the statutory limitations
imposed on existing riparian rights). In order for a riparian use to be recognized as a
preexisting beneficial use, it had to meet the appropiriative nonuse restrictions which
statutorily voided a water right after two years of nonuse. Of course, riparian users had
no notice whatsoever that their right could be limited for nonuse until the statute was
passed and by then it was too late. Further, beneficial riparian uses that began after
statehood were given a priority date of 1963, even if they were in fact much older.
130. See id. at 20.
11 lId
132. Id. at 21-22.
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ceeding.'33 Those who failed to attend these meetings lost legal protection for their rights to non-domestic water use.
Against this background it should not have been a surprise that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court continued to protect the riparian water
right. Because the Franco-American case came during a lull following
the 1963 legislation, the holding surprised many who relied on the
statute. The facts of the case were as follows: A cattle rancher with an
appropriative water right on Mill Creek challenged the Oklahoma Water Resources Board's ("OWRB") approval of an appropriation by the
City of Ada ("Ada") to the remaining flow of the creek.TM Plaintiffs alleged OWRB failed to consider the harm it would cause to holders of
riparian and appropriative rights, it should have considered that Ada
had pending applications for ground water that would fulfill their water need, and that Ada's water allocation would be subject to recall
because it was an out of basin transfer." Ada's own experts admitted
the level of appropriation approved for Ada would result in a totally
dewatered stream in normal water years if all appropriators claimed
their full share.1"' The trial court found for Plaintiff."7
Both parties appealed.'" The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed
in part and upheld in part."' The court held the Oklahoma Water Resources Board did not need to consider the groundwater application
and concluded the out of basin transfer was subject to recall.'" The
central portion of the ruling held that the OWRB failed to consider the
vested rights of riparian owners to the undefined future use of Mill
Creek. The Oklahoma riparian property owner enjoyed a vested
common law right to the reasonable use of the stream. Under Oklahoma common law, a vested right was "the power to do certain actions or
possess certain things lawfully."'41 The riparian right to use water at any
time was closely analogous to an easement and the Oklahoma Constitution forbids the takings of easements without compensation."' The

133. Id. at 20 ("[O]nly those riparian landowners who had sought parallel appropriation rights to back up their riparian rights, been lucky enough to read the newspaper publication, or otherwise been told about the hearings would have participated in
the vested rights proceedings. Water users who failed to participate in the vested rights
proceedings lost their water use rights.").
134. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568,
571 (Okla. 1990).
135. Allison, supra note 19, at 31 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 29.
137. Id. at 35.
138. Id. at 41.
139. Franco-American,855 P.2d at 568.
140. Id. at 580-82.
141. Id. at 576 (citations omitted).
142. Id. (citing OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 24 providing in part "[p]rivate property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation ... [private prop-

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Vo0lume 8

riparian right to initiate reasonable uses at any point in the future
could not be taken without just compensation and to the extent that
the 1963 legislation removed the riparian right to future use without
compensation, it was unconstitutional.' 3
The Court held the mechanism for elimination of future riparian
rights provided in the 1963 legislation was unconstitutional for several
reasons. First, the mechanism could not be sustained as valid regulation because the private right was not just limited, but also put to public use. 44 Zoning laws may be distinguished from takings because in
zoning the landowner's property right is merely limited. In a taking,
the property may no longer be used by its owner and the property is
put to public use. The 1963 legislation specifically provided the "powers granted by this act are in all respects for the benefit of the people
of the state."'45
Secondly, the riparian right was not protected in its full bloom.
The court held the heart of the riparian right was that it may be exercised at any time.'" Further, the 1963 legislation purported to forever
freeze the definition of reasonable. The court held that a flexible
definition of reasonableness was central to the riparian right.' 7 After
the 1963 legislation, the only way that a riparian could claim a water
right was through appropriation, where her use would not be judged
by its reasonableness, but rather by its place in time.
The Court did not entirely displace prior appropriation as an option for water rights acquisition in Oklahoma, but instead attempted to
fuse the two doctrines. The court held "the statutory right to appropriate stream water coexist[ed] with, but [did] not preempt or abrogate, the riparian owner's common-law right.""'' In order for these
doctrines to coexist, the court needed to resolve some of their inherent
contradictions. This effort necessarily rested on the bedrock holding
that the unquantifiable future use of riparian rights could not be taken
without compensation. Because of this constitutionally derived command, prior appropriation had to rest atop the riparian regime, rather
than displace it.
The court ruled that OWRB could approve Ada's appropriation
only if there was surplus water remaining after it provided for all anticipated in-basin needs, including those of appropriators and present
and future reasonable riparian uses, regardless of whether they had

erty] includes easements, personal property, and every valuable interest which can be
enjoyed and recognized as property.") (internal quotations omitted).
143. Id. at 571.
144. Id. at 577.
145. OKL.A. STAT. tit. 82, § 1086.1(B) (1990).
146. Franco-American,855 P.2d at 577.
147
,, id,
148. Id. at 576.
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perfected their riparian right under the 1963 legislation. 4 ' Thus, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court created a hierarchy: riparian owners received the superior water right, but were limited to reasonable use.
Below all the riparian owners were the prior appropriators, arranged
by priority date. Since the amount of water riparian owners claimed
could change, the appropriators then would have more or less water to
divert depending on the amount of water required by the riparian
owners.
VII. DEFENDING THE OKLAHOMA DOCTRINE ON LEGAL
GROUNDS
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding came under immediate
fire, but its reasoning was at least as sound as any that has attacked the
holding. The dissent differed from the majority on three main points.
First, the dissent argued the future use of stream water was not a vested
right. 5' Second, the dissent would have ruled the right to use water, as
other natural resources, could be limited or forfeited for nonuse over
time.' Finally, the dissent asserted the court should have upheld the
1963 legislation as a reasonable regulation of riparian rights comparable to zoning statutes, not a taking.'
Writing for the dissent, Vice Chief Justice Lavender argued the majority misunderstood riparian and prior appropriation rights. Justice
Lavender correctly pointed out that the majority decision was contrary
to the vast majority of decisions - even its closest analog in California.' 5
According to the dissent, the unquantifiable, correlative nature of the
riparian claim could not vest into a protected right. In the dissent's
view, only "preexisting uses ... [could] be said to be property in any
real or actual sense." 5
Secondly, despite the majority's conclusion that riparian rights
were vested and thus constitutionally protected from government takIn its first line of
ing, the dissent argued no taking had occurred.
reasoning, the dissent relied on the finding in the 1963 legislation that
the riparian right could be limited because continuous nonuse of water
was wasteful and injurious to the beneficial use of a valuable resource.' The dissent saw the history of the riparian right in Oklahoma
as protecting riparian use, not the riparian right.' 7 This led the dissent
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 578.
Id. at 582 (Lavender, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 582-83.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
Id.at 595.
Id. at 584.
Id.
at 586.
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to conclude the riparian right was usufructuary and therefore not protected from government regulation.'
Because the dissent would have ruled that riparian rights were not
vested, it saw the issue as a facial attack on the validity of the 1963 legislation, because it asserted an adverse affect on riparian land values.' 9
The dissent disposed of this argument using an analogy to zoning law
and applying the test for substantive due process: whether the regulaion substantially advances legitimate state interests without denying
the landowner economically viable use of the land." Because there
was no evidence that the 1963 regulations rendered use of riparian
land economically unviable, the dissent would have upheld them.''
While the dissent's arguments were the conventional conclusions
one would generally expect a court to reach, none of these three arguments were as effective as those suggested by the majority.
A.

VESTED RIGHTS

Whether the riparian right or the prior appropriation right may be
taken without compensation is an interesting question. The Oklahoma
decision seemed to indicate that riparian rights were more protected
than appropriative rights. This conclusion is contrary to the conventional wisdom. Many consider prior appropriation right a much
stronger property interest than the riparian interest because it has
more definite terms, such as amount, time, etc. and because by definition it is "vested by use" whereas many riparian rights are inchoate.
The conventional wisdom is incorrect as it misses the essential character of the water rights under each regime.
Prior appropriation gives appropriators license to divert water as it
crosses their territory. They have no right to water they do not or may
not divert and they have no claim of right over the remainder of the
water. The requirement that the appropriator continue to use the water makes his interest similar to a license, where a private party's use of
a property is allowed only so long as a condition is met. If this analogy
is apt, then that license may be removed without compensation.
Contrastingly, I would argue riparian law conveys a right to use all
of the water that crosses the riparian owner's property, whether it is
diverted or not, so long as the water is used reasonably. In effect, as
the water crosses the riparian owner's property boundary, she is vested
with a fee simple ownership over that quantum of water that exists on
her property at any moment in time, subject, of course, to the old

158.
159.
160.
161.

See id.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.
Id.
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maxim that one may not use one's property so as to injure another.' 2
Additionally, the riparian right does not depend on any particular use.
The water need not be diverted, used in place, swam in, fished on or
used in any other way; it cannot be lost simply because of nonuse. This
makes the riparian right more like other types of physical property.
The continuance of the right is not based on use and thus is not truly
usufructuary. The mischaracterization of riparian rights as purely usufructuary resulted in uncompensated takings in many jurisdictions, but
when one considers the character of the riparian right, it is my opinion
that such takings cannot be justified except under condemnation law.
Alternatively, the riparian has an easement to use the water - or not
- as it crosses her land. There are certain limitations that are enforced
over this property, but the use of all forms of property may be regulated by the state in a proper exercise of its police power. It is the ability to not use a riparian water right, and yet retain it that makes the riparian right a vested property interest. Barron's Dictionary of Legal
Terms defines a vested right as one that is not contingent, any right or
title to something that is not dependent upon the occurrence or failThe riparian's right to not use
ure of some specified future event.'
her water, and not lose the right, makes her right vested and thus protected from taking under the Oklahoma Constitution.
B. FORFEITURE

The dissent's second point of argument also misunderstood the
scope of the riparian right and sought to judge the right by prior appropriation standards. The argument that the riparian right should
not have been upheld because other common property regimes could
be lost by nonuse was illogical. The fact is that the rules for riparian
rights are different and these rights are not lost for nonuse.
The argument also did not consider the full scope of what it means
to "use" riparian property. More than likely the vast majority of riparian owners use their water non-consumptively. Under appropriation
law, these uses would not be considered because they divert no flow;
but riparian law allows reasonable uses that do not require diversion.
Thus using water to increase property value, for recreation and for the
support of wildlife, is a reasonable use."' Under riparian law, a ripar-

162. See Reid v. Gifford, 1 Hopk. Ch. 416, 419 (N.Y. Ch. 1825) ("The water in its
natural descent from the lake becomes the property of each of the complainants successively; all the complainants thus have right in the same subject; and the nature of
the case, forms a community of interests, in the complainants."). See also Rose, supra
note 4, at 284 (describing Reid as one of the foundational cases in the development of
reasonable use riparianism).
163. BARRON'sLAwDIcTIoNARY549 (5th ed. 2003).
164. Franco-Amencan,885 P.2d at 578 n.53.
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ian owner has been using his property, if only to enjoy the view from
his back porch. Dewatering the stream would destroy this use.
C. THE ZONING ANALOGY
Finally, the dissent argued that instead of a taking of riparian
rights, the legislation should be viewed as a permissible and reasonable
exercise of police power. The argument went that because the legislation limited the right to use a property and did not take the property;
the legislation was a proper exercise of the police power, and not a
taking. This argument has several flaws.
First, the Oklahoma legislation did not merely limit the use of
property, but instead took it for public use. Zoning may be construed
as permissible regulation, because it does not take the property for
public use. Instead, zoning limits what activities may be conducted on
the property; forbidding certain industries or limiting the heights of
buildings are two examples. In effect the legislature can say "don't do
that!" within the confines of the Fifth Amendment;'" the legislature
may not say "gimme that!" unless it pays just compensation. The Oklahoma Legislature did not merely limit what riparian rights holders
could do with their property; instead it took that property and redistributed it to appropriators.
Such an action is closer to uncompensated taking than it is to zoning regulation. Apart from the above argument, distribution of water
rights differs from zoning; even granting the dissent's analogy, their
conclusion is not convincing. If viewed as regulation similar to zoning,
the 1963 legislation can only be seen as a zoning law that demands the
discontinuation of lawful, preexisting, non-conforming uses. Such laws
have been held per se confiscatory.'" Any arguments that riparian
right holders were not using their property are attempts to apply beneficial use doctrine to takings and zoning jurisprudence. Judging use by
a general standard reveals that riparian users were using their water;
they just may not have been diverting it.
Arguments regarding the legal reasoning of the majority opinion
in Franco-American are certainly interesting, but more central to this
paper are the arguments surrounding the policy implications of the
ruling. It should come as no surprise that I argue the policy implications are promising indeed.

165.
Unless, of course, it "goes too far." See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
166. SjP. P.g., Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo. 1965); Pennsylvania
Northwestern Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1376 (Pa. 1991).
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VIII. DEFENDING THE OKLAHOMA DOCTRINE ON POLICY
GROUNDS
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision not only flowed from a
strong legal background, it also has the promise to accomplish many of
the positive elements of synthesis. This section will look at the possible
outcomes of the Oklahoma doctrine, examining how it allows for a
more sensible management of the resource, how it allows for a strong
and steady supply of water for municipalities, and how it adopts the
most effective aspects of riparian doctrine while retaining the most
positive elements of prior appropriation.
A. THE DECISION ENCOURAGES SENSIBLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The Oklahoma Supreme Court not only relied on good law in making its decision, it also made a decision that reflected great foresight
and understanding of policy matters. Riparian law is a doctrine that
peculiarly involves a wide range of stakeholders in deciding how the
common pool resource of stream water should be used. This wide
range of interests has the best chance of closing externalities and leading to true sustainable use of stream water resources.
Creating policy that properly administers common property resources is among the greatest challenges humanity faces today. As famously described by Garret Hardin, perverse incentives cause users to
over utilize and destroy common property resources. ' The tragedy of
the commons results because each user of the resource receives a particularized benefit for his use, but the cost for the diminution of the
resource's value is borne by all of the users. Thus, one gets a large reward, but a small cost, from utilizing the resource. A rational actor
when faced with a particularized benefit and a shared cost will attempt
to utilize the resource as quickly as possible. The tragedy is best
avoided by converting the common resource into a private resource,
but as discussed, this conversion is problematic when it comes to water.
For a resource with inalienable common goods, careful management is
the best hope.
When common resources are managed for only select stakeholders,
the externalities from those transactions accumulate and the resource
deteriorates. Prior appropriation is a perfect example of the management of a common resource for an insufficient number of stakeholders. Appropriation favors diversion and in its classic form offers
no protection for instream uses. The doctrine drives diversion to the
point where a valuable river will be over appropriated and often no
167. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. AM. 1243
(1968). See also NAr'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONs 24 (Elinor
Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
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water will remain in dry months. Many of the external costs of this
system are obvious; the system damages ecological benefits and harms
or kills wildlife. Fisheries are destroyed and the societies supported by
those fisheries are injured and displaced. However, there are less obvious costs that may not be exposed unless there is full involvement of
all affected parties.
The cost that the community shares for the diminution of the
common resource is an external cost of consumptive water use. Much
of the practice of policy making in common pool resources is concerned with closing externalities. Predicate to eliminating the externalities is understanding the external costs assessed from the transaction. The simplest way to identify all of these costs is to solicit input
from all of the stakeholders.
It is often difficult to recognize the entirety of the parties in a transaction; affected parties are not necessarily interested parties and they
may not even know how or why their interests are being affected.
Thus, transforming affected parties into interested and educated
stakeholders who are involved in the policy making process is a key to
effective management of common pool resources. The riparian doctrine as it stands today is quite effective at that transformative process.
As one commentator noted: "In a very real sense, the protection of the
public-good aspect of the eastern rivers was the actual mission of riparian law. Riparian law allowed a modicum of consumption.., but preserved the bulk of the river for all of them."'1
The same scholar described "hooks" that cause people to place a
stake in ecosystem protection, which she called a great nebulous
stock. ' Over time, hooks such as the economic uses of an ecosystem
product (fishing, irrigation), property rights (view, property value),
charismatic plants and animals (salmonids), geographic values and
aesthetics (the scenic rivers), and ecological education have all been
effective in increasing a widespread desire for "healthy" rivers."' The
riparian approach, with its reasonable use standard, allows these public
desires to find expression in actual river management.
Since many property owners exercise correlative rights over the
course of the entire river, the broad spectrum of uses are considered
and protected to the extent that they are reasonable. The hooks that
Professor Rose described helped inform courts and water managers
about the scope of reasonability. Thus, extractive uses that are of low
monetary value are likely to offend stakeholders who have been
"hooked" by any of these concerns. If a stream is dewatered to irrigate
an alfalfa field, fishing guides and higher value irrigators may be of168. Rose, supra note 60, at 346.
169. Carol M. Rose, Demystifying Ecosystem Management, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 867-68
(1997).
170. Id. at 867.
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fended by what they see as economically poor allocation of resources.
Home owners will protest lowered property values. As their recreational opportunities are imperiled, the general public, to some extent
enamored with animals such as trout, beaver, and river otters, will be
outraged that the species they value are suffering in order to provide
more water for cattle. Visitors to wild and scenic rivers will not stand
for it when the centerpieces of those parks are reduced to a turbid
trickle. Those schooled in the broad importance of healthy ecosystems
will protest their destruction. All of these viewpoints are properly considered under what constitutes a reasonable use.
This flexibility and responsiveness, combined with the basic tenet
of riparian law that water should remain in stream, contrast starkly with
true prior appropriation law, which demands water for older uses
without regard to whether those uses are reasonable under modern
standards. It makes little policy sense that a use should be continued
simply because it has persisted for a long time. Indeed, as society progresses it is often the new use that has the greatest economic value and
efficiency. The tangle of ancient, often inefficient water use permits
may discourage new, more efficient investments.
Further, when appropriators are confronted with a continued and
evolving standard of reasonableness they will be given an incentive to
improve the efficiency of their use. This incentive is quite obviously
missing from the true appropriative scheme. The strict requirements
that any changes to an appropriation not affect downstream juniors
that rely on return flows inhibit improvements that would make diversions more efficient. At the same time, the waste doctrine is not seriously enforced in many appropriation jurisdictions. 1 The reasonable
use standard of riparian law is flexible enough to rule that wasteful uses
are unreasonable and the improving efficiency should be encouraged.
Professor Rose explains why it is important to spread the benefits
of resource use: when everyone receives a benefit, everyone has a
stake. 7' If all of the interests are recognized then externalities are diminished; the whole picture is examined. At the same time, spreading
costs increases the sense of ownership, again leading to increased stake
holding and fewer externalities. Because prior appropriation looks at
individual uses to see whether they are beneficial in a very limited
sense, the regime often overlooks the impact of the use on the broader
river system. Reasonable use's focus on the overall picture makes it
more effective in deciding what uses should be allowed and what uses
should be phased out.

171.
Peter G. Scott, Aquifer Storage and Recovery in the Columbia Basin: The Need for
Legislative Action, 21 PUB. LAND & RESOURcES L. REv. 36, 60 (2000).
172. Rose, supra note 169, at 869.
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THE DECISION ALLOWS FOR DEPENDABLE MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLIES

The Franco-American decision was derided as having "endangered
every municipal water supply in Oklahoma."'73 And yet life in Oklahoma goes on." Oklahoma survived one of the most severe droughts
in recorded history in 1995-96" without overturning the FrancoAmerican decision. The alarmists fail to note that riparian law provides
adequate protection for municipal water supplies.
Because the riparian right is considered to be so uncertain in quantity and because the traditional doctrine tied water rights so closely to
riparian property, many commentators who favor appropriation are
skeptical about the doctrine's ability to provide water for growing cities. Of course, cities such as New York.7 have arguably had less water
related growth problems than cities in western appropriation states.
The obvious response to this observation is that the west is significantly
more arid and comparisons are therefore inapt. While this argument
has merit, it is undeniably true that a city like New York must supply
more water to its residents than it has access to within its boundaries.
In supplying water to city populations, riparian doctrine has proven
flexible and dependable.
Riparian cities collect water in three main ways. First they may purchase riparian land through voluntary sale or via eminent domain.
Second, they may use their groundwater resources. Finally, they may
collect rainwater and surface water runoff in reservoirs. Most municipalities use all three methods. For example, starting in 1667 New York
City pumped water from a well in Bowling Green Park.17 In the late
nineteenth century and through much of the twentieth centuries, New
York City consistently improved its water supply, acquiring the land
necessary for Delaware, Catskill, and Croton reservoir systems through

173. Hageman, supra note 45, at 193.
174. Detractors claim that life goes on because the legislature and the OWRB essentially ignored the Supreme Court's holding. See Allison, supranote 19, at 58. Whether
this contention bears merit is beyond the scope of this article.
175.
OKLAHoMA DROUGHT McMT. TEAM, OKLAHOMA DROUGHT CONTINGENCY PLAN 1
(Aug.
1997),

http://www.oATb.state.ok.us/supply/drought/pdf-dro/drought-plan.pdf.
176. While New York is experiencing increasing stress on its water supply, this problem is arguably more related to water quality and infrastructure rather than quantity.
New York City is currently constructing a third underground aqueduct to increase
supply from its existing reservoir system and should the Hudson River restoration project eventually be successful, New York will have enough drinking water for the foreseeable future.
177.
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., CELEBRATING NEW YORK CITY's

CLEAN DRINKING WATER, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/celebrate.html
visited Sept. 12, 2004).
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voluntary purchases and state endorsed condemnation actions.'78
These reservoirs accumulate stream and rain water and store it for city
use. r
Municipal water uses are likely to be protected because their reasonableness is so plainly expressed by their importance. Apparently,
many casual observers fear that municipal water supplies will be curtailed under the doctrine of reasonable use. However, reasonable use
determinations are made on equitable bases. It is hard to imagine a
situation where a judge would rule municipal water use unreasonable
unless it is truly unnecessary or wasteful. If the city's water use is manifestly wasteful then it seems obvious that such use should be curtailed if
it harms others.
Riparian doctrine's flexibility in providing municipal water is demonstrated in the case law. On May 4, 1931, the United States Supreme
Court decided that New York could divert water from the headwaters
of the Delaware River for the people of New York City." Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote for the United States Supreme Court, and
stated,
A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of
life that must be rationed among those who have power over it. New
York has the physical power to cut off all the water within its jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such a power to the destruction of
the interest of lower states could not be tolerated. And on the other
hand equally little could NewJersey be permitted to require New York
to give up its power altogether in order that the river might come
down to it undiminished. Both States have real and substantial interests in the River that must be reconciled as best they may. The different traditions and practices in different parts of the country may lead
to varying results but the effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas. 8'
The first imperative of reasonable use review is always the best result.
It is time for those who create water law and policy to turn their eyes to
that end. The best result will never allow Tulsa to dry up and blow
away.
Municipal supplies are further protected by the Oklahoma Supreme Court's early acceptance that use of riparian water off riparian
property does not affect determinations of reasonableness. 8 ' Given
these facts, it is safe to say that once Oklahoma cities acquire riparian
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property they will have a more secure and dependable water right than
if they acquired an appropriation right on the same stream.
C.

THE DECISION RETAINS BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION

It is difficult to dispute that the Franco-American court preserved
more of the riparian right as it existed prior to 1963, than it did the
appropriative regime legislated in that year. However, one must remember that the riparian right by that time had already adopted the
most important and beneficial aspects of prior appropriation law; in
fact, no state relies solely on the English doctrine riparian scheme."' It
is crucial to keep in mind that Franco-American does not represent a
return to natural flow riparianism.
Riparian water law began as a restrictive doctrine, quite hostile to
consumptive use and development, but it has since adopted the most
important and sensible aspects of prior appropriation. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin are all regulated
riparian states," and as discussed above, Oklahoma's riparian doctrine
has made significant reforms of the English doctrine riparian law.
Riparian states have adopted many of the most important aspects
of prior appropriation. First and foremost, regulated riparian jurisdictions, including Oklahoma, generally require permits for any withdrawal of water.' The regulated riparian Model Water Code allows a
broad range of consumptive uses, not just domestic and ancient uses.
The requirement that water be used only on riparian land has been left
by the wayside, taking with it the unity of title rule." Since 1946, water
had been separated from riparian land. The holding in Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas allowed riparian owners to sell their water rights to off
property consumers who could use the water anywhere they chose, so
long as they used it reasonably."' This decision presaged similar recommendations in the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code by over
fifty years.
The Franco-American court took the extra step of allowing appropriation on the same river as riparian rights so that consumers in need
of water need not purchase it from riparian owners. The court also
183. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Three Models of Surface Water Allocation Law in the
United States, Materials for the Eastern Water Resources Law, Policy and Technology
Seminar 10 (May 6-7, 2004) (on file with author).
184. Id. at 21.
Questions, at
185. Oklahoma
Water Resource
Board,
Frequently Asked
http://www.orwb.state.ok.us/util/faq.php?s=wu (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
186. flllapena, sjtearnfotel] A
187. Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas, Co., 172 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1946).
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retained the priority system for allocating water between appropriators
in times of shortage. In many ways, Oklahoma case law had already
taken riparian doctrine to the midpoint and prepared it for synthesis.
In Franco-American, the court moved prior appropriation to the midpoint as well.
IX. CONCLUSION
In summation, the Oklahoma doctrine represents sound water policy because it includes a wider assortment of interests than does prior
appropriation. Involving all user groups tends to close externalities,
enabling sensible resource allocations. The riparian system has proven
adequate for securing water rights for some of the nation's largest cities; the incorporation of appropriative rights into the equation merely
allows municipalities one more way to acquire water. Finally, allowing
for use of water off of riparian land extends the riparian doctrine to
allow for thorough development of water resource while maintaining
the oversight of reasonable use review to ensure that water is used responsibly. The Oklahoma doctrine may be able to rectify the failures
of the traditional water law regimes and emerge as a coherent synthesis
for the future, if we just give it the chance.
While most states that have adopted prior appropriation have entirely discarded riparian law, Oklahoma has to some extent maintained
a hybrid system where riparian and appropriative rights are both respected. Many commentators see the two doctrines as irreconcilable
and predict that the hybrid states will soon be forced to choose one or
the other. These commentators assume that water rights are binary
and can only be addressed by opposite and irreconcilable regimes.
Further, nearly every commentator assumes the riparian doctrine is
inexorably tied to water rich areas while prior appropriation is inescapably tied to areas where water is scarce. This view ignores the ability
of laws to evolve to address changing situations and it ignores the current state of water use in both areas. In fact, the two regimes have
been moving toward a common middle ground since their very conception. Oklahoma has merely taken another step in this process of
synthesis.
Water is a strange thing. It is a complicated resource with important private aspects and vital public aspects, all of which must be carefully considered if a system of water law is to be what Justice Holmes
asked of it: "an equitable apportionment..'. A synthesized jurisdiction
allows the private and public aspects of water to reach an economically
efficient balance by looking at the totality of circumstances - including
external costs - and consciously and continuously deciding which uses
are most reasonable. A synthesized jurisdiction will place its highest
188.
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priority in ensuring that water is put to its best use, not its oldest use or
its most natural use. A synthesized water law is the next step. It is the
future.

